We propose a norm of consistency for a mixed set X of defeasible and strict sen tences, based on a probabilistic interpre tation of these sentences. This norm es tablishes a clear distinction between knowl edge bases depicting exceptions and those containing outright contradictions.
Introduction
There is a sharp difference between exceptions and outright contradictions. Two statements like "typ ically, penguins do not fly" and "red penguins can fl y", can be accepted as a description of a world in which redness defines an abnormal type of pen guin. However, the statements "typically, birds fly"
and "typically, birds do not fl y" stand in outright contradiction to each other (unless birds are non ex istent). Whatever interpretation we give to "typi cally", it is hard to imagine a world containing birds in which both statements can hold simultaneously.
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Yet, in spite of this clear distinction, there is no for mal treatment of inconsistencies in existing propos als for non-monotonic reasoning.
Consider a database .:l containing the following sentences: "all birds fl y", "typically, penguins are birds" and "typically, penguins don't fly". A cir cumscriptive theory ( [McCarthy, 86] ) consisting of the sentences in .:l plus the fact that Tweety is a pen guin, will render the conclusion that either Tweety is a fl ying penguin (and therefore is an exception to the rule "typically, penguins don't fly"), or Tweety is an exception to the rule "typically, penguins are birds" and Tweety does not fly. A formalization of the database in terms of a default theory (see [Re iter, 80] ) will render similar conclusions for our pen guin Tweety. Nevertheless, the above set of rules strike our intuition as being inherently wrong: if all birds fiy, there cannot be a nonempty class of ob jects (penguins) that are "typically birds" and yet "typically, don't fly". We cannot accept this data base as merely depicting exceptions between classes of individuals; rather, it would seems that there is no possible state of affairs in which this set of sen tences can hold simultaneously1• However, if we now change the first sentence of .:l from strict to defea sible (to read "typically, birds fl y" instead of "all birds fl y"), we are willing to cope with the apparent contradiction by considering the set of penguins as exceptional birds. This interpretation will remain satisfactory even if we made the second rule strict (to read "all penguins are birds") . Yet, if we further add to .:l the sentence "typically, birds are penguins" we are faced again with an intuitive inconsistency.
This paper deals with the problem of formal izing, detecting and isolating such inconsistencies in knowledge bases containing both defeasible and strict information2• We will interpret a defeasible sentence such as "typically, if l/J then ¢" (written tjJ -1/J), as the conditional probability P(t/Jit/J) ;?: 1-� , where � > 0 3• A strict sentence such as "if rp it must be the case that u" (written rp => u), will be in terpreted as the conditional probability P(ulrp) = 1.
Our criterion for testing inconsistency translates to that of determining if there exists a probability dis tribution P that satisfies all these conditional prob abilities for all � > 0. Furthermore, to match our intuition that conditional sentences do not refer to empty classes, nor are they confi rmed by merely "fal sifying" their antecedents, we also require that P be proper, i.e., that it does not render any antecedent as totally impossible. We shall show that these two re quirements properly capture our intuition regarding the consistency of conditionals sentences.
We also define a notion of entailment in which plausible conclusions are guaranteed arbitrarily high probabilities in all proper probability assignments in which the defeasible premises have arbitrarily high probabilities and in which the strict premises have probabilities equal to one. A characterization of the relation between entailment and consistency is shown through the theorems of section 3.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 in troduces notation and some preliminary definitions. Consistency and entailment are explored in sec tion 3. An effective procedure for testing consistency and entailment is presented in section 4. Section 5 contains illustrative examples, and in section 6 we summarize the main results of the paper. All proofs are given in the appendix.
2

Notation and Preliminary Definitions
We will use ordinary letters from the alphabet (ex cept d, s and x) as propositional variables. Let F be a language built up in the usual way from a fi nite set of propositional variables and the connec tives"-." and "V" (the other connectives will be used as syntactic abbreviations), and let the greek letters t/J, 1/J, rp, u stand for formulas of :F. Let tjJ and 1/J be two formulas in F. We will use a new binary connective "-" to construct a defeasi ble sentence tjJ _.. t/J, which may be interpreted as "if tP then typically t/J". The set of defeasible sentences will be denoted by D. Similarly, given rp, u in :F, the binary connective " => " will be used to form a strict sentence cp => u, which is to be interpreted as "if cp then it must be the case that u"4• The set of strict 3Intuitively we would like defeasible sentences to be interpreted as conditional probabilities with very high likelihood and � to be an infinitesimal quantity. For more on probabilistic semantics for default reasoning the reader is referred to [Pearl, 88] .
4In the domain of non-monotonic multiple inheritance networks, the interpretation for the defeasible sentence 1/J -+ ?/; would be "typically 1/J's are '1/;'s", while the inter pretation for the strict sentence 'f' =* rr would be "all 'f'1S 135 sentences will be denoted by S 5• We will use X to stand for the union of D and S and x, d, s as vari ables for sentences in X, D and S respectively. We will use the term conditional when talking about a sentence that can be either defeasible or strict. If x denotes a conditional sentence with antecedent cp and consequent t/J, then the negation of x, denoted by .-x, is defined as a conditional with antecedent cp and consequent -.1/J. Finally, the material coun terpart of a conditional sentence with antecedent ¢ and consequent 1/J is defined as the formula tjJ ::> t/J (where "::>" denotes material implication).
Given a factual language :F, a truth assignment for :F is a function t, mapping the sentences in :F to the set {1, 0}, {1 for True and 0 for False), such that t respects the usual boolean connectives 6• A sentence x E X with antecedent tjJ and consequent t/J will be verified by t, ift(t/J) = t(t/J) = 1. Ift(t/J) = 1 but t(t{J) = O, the sentence x will be falsified by t. Finally, when t(tjJ) = 0, x will be considered as neither verified nor falsified.
Definition 1 (Probability assignment). Let P be a probability function on truths ass ignments, such that L:;j P(tj) = 1. We define a probability assign ment P on a sentence tjJ -1/.J from D as:
( 1) where ft, . . . , t; are all the possible truth assignments to the propositional variables in :F and P(tj) is the probability assigned to ti. We assign probabilities to the sentences in S in exactly the same fashion. P will be considered to be proper, if the denominator of Eq (1) is non-zero for every sentence inDUS.
The definition of probability ass ignment above, attaches a conditional probability interpretation
to the sentences in X. Eq. (1) states that the prob ability of a conditional sentence x with antecedent tjJ and consequent t/J is equal to the probability of x being verified (i.e. tj(tP t\ t/J) = 1), divided by the probability of its being either verified or falsifi ed (i.e. tj(tP) = 1). Up to this point the only difference between de feasible sentences and strict sentences was syntactic. They were assigned probabilities in the same fash ion and they were verifi ed and falsified under the same truth assignments. Their differences will be come clear in the next section, and it rests upon the way they enter the definition of consistency. are rr's". 6Note that both "-+" and"=*" can occur only as the main connective.
�!Note that if there are n propositional variables in :F, there will be 2n different truth assignments for :F.
Probabilistic Consistency and Entailment
In all theorems and definitions below, we will con sider that the language :F is fixed, and d1, s1, :1/ will stand for new defeasible, strict and conditional sentences respectively, with antecedents and conse quents in :F.
Definition 2 (Probabilistic consistency) Let D and S be sets of defeasible and strict sentences respec tively, constructed from formulas in :F. We say that X = D U S is probabilistically consistent (p consistent) if, for every e: > O, there is a proper probability assignment P such that P(d) � 1 -e for all defeasible sentences din D, and P(s) = 1 for all strict sentences s in S.
Intuitively, consistency means that it is possible for all defeasible sentences to be as close to abso lute certainty as desired, while the probability as signment for strict sentences is fixed at one (i.e., we have absolute certainty about the strict sentences). Another way of formulating consistency is as follows: consider a constant e > 0 and let Px e stand for the set of probability distributions proper for X such that if P E Px,e then P(d) � 1-e and P(s) = 1 for all defeasible sentences d E D and all strict sen tences s E S. Consistency guarantees that Px , e is non-empty for every e > 0.
Before developing a syntactical test for consis tency (Theorem 1), we need to define the concepts of tolerance and confirmation.
Definition 3 (Tolerance) Let x be a sentence in X with antecedent ¢; and consequent 'tj;. We say that x is tolerated by the rest of the sentences in X, if there exists a truth assignment t such that the for mula¢; 1\ 1/J 1\ XM is satisfi ed by t where XM denotes the conjunction of the material counterparts of the sentences in X.
Thus, x is tolerated by a set of conditional sentences X, if there is a truth assignment t such that x is verified while no sentence in X is falsified by t.
Definition 4 (Confirmation) We will say that a non-empty set of sentences X = DUS is confirmable when:
is tolerated by the rest of the sentences in X. 2. If D is empty, each sentence s in S is tolerated by the rest of the sentences in S.
Theorem 1 Let X = D U S be a non-empty set of defeasible and strict sentences. X is p-consistent if and only if every non-empty subset of X is con firmable.
Theorem 1 yields a simple decision procedure for determining p-consistency and identifying the incon sistent set in X (see section 4).
Before turning our attention to issues of entailing new conditional sentences from a consistent data base, we need to make explicit a particular form of inconsistency:
Definition 5 (Substantive inconsistency) Let X be a p-consistent set of conditional sentences, and let x1 be a conditional sentence with antecedent ¢;. We will say that X U { x 1 } is substantively inconsistent if XU {True -t ¢} is p-consistent but XU {.r1} is p-inconsistent.
Non-substantive inconsistency occurs whenever the antecedent of a conditional sentence has probability equal to zero in all the probabilistic models support ing the sentences in a consistent set X. It will be come apparent from the theorems to follow, that a set XU { x} is non-substantively inconsistent iff both X U { x } and X U {"" x} are inconsistent.
The concept of entailment introduced below is based on the same probabilistic interpretation for defeasible and strict sentences used in the definition of p-consistency and on the requirements of proper ness for their probabilistic models. Intuitively, we want p-entailed conclusions to receive arbitrarily high probability in all proper probability distribu tions in which the defeasible premises have also ar bitrarily high probability, and in which the strict premises have probability equal to one.
1. There exists a non-empty set of probability dis tributions which are proper for X U { d'} and 2. For all e > 0 there exists 6 > 0 such that for all probability assignments P E Px,6 which are proper for d1, P(d1) � 1-t:. 
If X is p consistent, then X strictly p-entails s ' (written X 1=. s1) if:
1. There exists a non-empty set of probability dis tributions which are proper for XU {s1} and 2. For all e > 0, every probability assignment P E Px,e that is proper for X and s1 satisfies P(s1) = 1.
Theorem 3 If X = Du S is p-consistent, X strictly p-entails </> :::: :> tjJ if and only if there exists a subset S' of S such that S U {True -t rjJ} is p-consistent and ¢ :::: :> •1/J is not tolerated by S'.
Note that strict p-entailment subsumes p entailment, i.e., if a conditional sentence is strictly p-enta.iled then it is also p-entailed. Also, to test whether a conditional sentence is strictly p-entailed we need to check its status only with respect to the strict set in X. This confirms the intuition that we can not deduce "hard" rules from "soft" ones. However, strict p-entailment is different than logical entailment because the requirements of substantive consistency and properness for the probability distri butions distinguishes strict sentences from their ma terial counterpart. For example, consider the data base X = S = {True =} •a} which is clearly p consistent. While X logically entails a :> b, X does not strictly p-entails a =} b, since the antecedent a is always falsifi ed.
For completeness, we now present two more the orems relating consistency and entailment. Similar versions of these theorems, for the case of purely defeasible sentences, first appeared in [Adams, 75] . They follow from previous theorems and definitions.
Theorem 4 If X does not p-entail d' and XU {d'} is substantively inconsistent, then for all e > 0 there exists a probability assignment P E Px,. which is proper for X and d1 such that P(d') � e.
• It cannot be the case that both d' and -d' are substantively inconsistent with respect to X.
• It cannot be the case that both s1 and "' s1 are substantively inconsistent with respect to any subset of S.
4
An Effective Procedure for
Testing Consistency
A procedure to test the consistency of a database X = DuS in accordance with Theorem 1 will consist of two phases: In the first phase, until D is empty, we repeatedly remove a sentence from D that is tol erated by the rest of the sentences in D U S. In the second phase we must test whether every sen tence in S is tolerated by the rest of the sentences in S (without removing any sentence). If both phases can be successfully completed X is consistent, else X is inconsistent.
The same procedure can be used for entailment, since to determine whether a defeasible sentence d'
is entailed by X we need only test the consistency of XU{ .... .. d'} and XU {d'} (to make sure that the former is substantively inconsistent). The following theorem and the correctness of the procedure out lined above are proven in the appendix. (2) is tolerated), the assignment t(f) = 1 will falsify sentence {3), while the assignment t(f) == 0 will fal sify sentence (1). A similar situation arises when we check if sentence (3) can be tolerated. Note that changing sentence ( 1) to be defeasible, ren ders the database consistent: b -f is tolerated by sentences {2) and (3) through the truth assignment t(b) == t(f) == 1 and t(p) = 0, while the remain ing sentences tolerate each other. If we further add to this modified database the sentence p A b -+ /, we get an inconsistent set, thus showing (by Theo rem 2) that p A b --+ •f is p-entailed, as expected ("typically penguins_birds don't fly"). The set will become inconsistent again by adding the sentence b -p ("typically, birds are penguins"), in confor mity to the graphical criteria of [Pearl, 87] .
Example 2 On quakers and republicans.
Consider the following set of sentences:
1. n--+ r ("typically, Nixonites 8 are republicans") 2. n--+ q ("typically, Nixonites are quakers") 3. q =} p ("all quakers are pacifi sts") 4. r =} •P ("all republicans are non-pacifists") 5. p ___. c ("typically, pacifists are persecuted") Sentence (5) is tolerated by all others, but the re maining sentences (1)-(4) are not confirmable. Thus this set of sentences is inconsistent. Note that The orem 1 and the procedure outlined in the previous section not only provide a criteria to decide whether a database of defeasible and strict information is in consistent, but also identify the offending set of sen tences.
We can modify the above set of sentences to be:
1. n => r ("all Nixonites are republicans") 2. n => q ("all Nixonites are quakers") 3. q --+ p ("typically, quakers are pacifists") 4. r --+ -,p ("typically, republicans are non pacifi sts") 5. p--+ c ("typically, pacifists are persecuted)
This database is consistent. There is an important difference between the former case and this one. If all quakers are pacifists and all republicans are non pacifists, our intuition immediately reacts against the idea of finding an individual that is both a quaker and a republican. On the other hand, this last set of sentences allows a "Nixonite" that is both a quaker and a republican to be either pacifi st or non pacifist. Note that both w __. p and w --> ..., p are consistent so neither is p-entailed, and we can assert that the con clusion is ambiguous (i.e., we cannot decide whether a "Nixonite" is typically a "pacifist" or not). Finally, if we make (2) and (4) 1. n--+ r ("typically Nixonites are republicans") 2. n => q ("<l:ll Nixonites are quakers") 3. q __. p ("typically quakers are pacifists") 4. r => -,p ("all republicans are non-pacifists") 5. p __. c ("typically pacifi sts are persecuted)
Not surprisingly, the criterion of Theorem 1 renders this database consistent and n --+ """' P is p-entailed in conformity with the intuition expressed in [Horty et. al., 88] .
Conclusions
The probabilistic interpretation of conditional sen tences yields a consistency criterion in line with human intuition. The criterion also identifies the smallest group of sentences that produces the incon sistency. A tight relation between entailment and consistency was established and an effective proce dure for testing both consistency and entailment was devised.
Although our definition of p-entailment yields a rather conservative set of conclusions (e.g., one that does not permit chaining or contraposition (Pearl, 88] ), it constitutes a core of plausible consequences that should be common to every reasonable system of defeasible reasoning [Pearl, 89] . For example, the notion of p-entailment was shown to be equivalent to that of entailment in preferential models seman tics, whenever the sentences in X are purely defea sible (see [Lehmann et. al., 88] ). Consequently, the decision procedure for both p-entailment and pref erential entailment should be identical (whenever S is empty). It is still interesting to compare our re sults and procedures with those obtained from pref-erential models semantics for databases containing a mixture of defeasible and strict sentences.
Future work includes a graphical decision criterion for consistency in mixed inheritance networks (ex tending that of [Pearl, 87] ), and an exploration into more powerful notions of entailment as suggested in [Pearl, 88] . 
A Appendix: Theorems and Proofs
Theorem 1 Let X = D U S be a non-empty set of defeasible and strict sentences constructed from the formulas in :F. X is p-consistent if and only if every non-empty subset of X is confirmable.
Proof of the only if part: We want to show that if there exists a non-empty subset of X which is not confirmable, then X is not p-consistent. The proof is facilitated by introducing the notion of quasi conjunction ( [Adams, 75}): Given a set of defaults D = { ¢1 -+ 'lj;1, . .. , ¢., -+ 'lj;., } the quasi-conjunction of D is the defeasible sentence,
The quasi-conjunction C(D) bears interesting relations to the set D. In particular, if D is confirmed by some assignment t, C(D) will be verified by t. This is so because the verification of at least one sentence of D by t guarantees that the antecedent of C(D) (i.e. the formula [¢1 V . .. V ¢n] in Eq. (3)) is mapped into 1, and the fact that no sentence in D is falsified guarantees that the consequent of C(D) (i.e. the formula [(¢1 :J lj;I) A ... I\(¢., :J 'lj;.,)] in Eq. (3)) is also mapped into 1. Similarly, if at least one sentence of Dis falsified, its quasi-conjunction is also falsified. In this case, the consequent of C(D) is mapped into 0 since at least one of the material implication in the conjunction is falsified. Additionally, let Up(C(D)) = 1-P(C(D)) (the uncertainty of C( D)) where P( C( D)) is the probability assigned to the quasi-conjunction of D according to Eq. (1 ), then, it is shown in [Adams, 66] that the uncertainty of the quasi-conjunction of D is less or equal to the sum of the uncertainties of each of the sentences in D, i.e. Up(C(D)) � I;;(l-P(d; )) where the sum is taken over all d; in D.
We are now ready to proceed with the proof. Let X' = D1 u S' be a subset of X where D' is a subset of D and S' is a subset of S. If X' is not confirmable then one of the following cases must occur: Case 1.-S' is empty and D' is not confirmable9• In this case, the quasi-conjunction for D' is not verifiable; from Eq. (1), we have that P(C(D')) = 0 and Up(C(D')) = 1. It follows, by the properties of the quasi conjunction outlined above that I;;(l-P(dD) over all di in D' is at least 1. If the number of sentences in
which implies that at least one sentence in D' has probability smaller than 1-*· Hence, it is impossible to have P(d1) � 1-E:, for every E: > 0, for every defeasible sentenced' E D'. Thus, X is p-inconsistent.
Case 2.-D' is empty. Proof by contradiction: assume that S1 is not confirmable and X' is p-consistent. If X1 is p-consistent, there must exist a probability assignment P satisfying definition 2, and a set T of truth assignments such that P(ti) > 0 for all t; in T. If S' is not confirmable, then either one of the following conditions must be true: there is at least one truth assignment t' in T such that t' falsifies a sentence s' in S', or there is a sentence s " in S' such that no truth ass ignment t" in T verifies s " . The requirements of p-consistency state that for every sentence r.p � u inS, P ( r.p � u) = 1. Thus, from Eq. (1),
which immediately implies that, no sentence s' E S' can be falsified by any t E T. Hence, the first condition for the unconfirmability of S1 cannot occur. On the other hand, if there is no t" in T that verifies (nor falsifies) a sentences" inS', the denominator of P(s11) is 0 (see Eq. ( 1)), and Pis not proper as required.
Since by the definition of confirmability these two are the only conditions under which a set of purely strict sentences can be unconfirmable, we conclude that S' cannot be confirmable while X is p-consistent.
Case 3.-Neither D' nor S' are empty and X' is not confirmable. That is, either D' is not confirmable or every t' in 1' that verifies a sentence in D' falsifies at least one sentence in S'. The first situation will lead us back to case 1 while the second to a contradiction similar to case 2 above. In either case, X is not p-consistent.
Proof of the if part: Assume that every non-empty subset of X= DUS is confirmable. Then the following two constructions are feasible:
9This ca.se is covered by Theorem 1.1 in [Adams, 75).
• We can construct a finite "nested decreasing sequence" of non-empty subsets of X, namely X 1, ••. , X m, (X == Xl), and an associated sequence of truth assignments t�, ... , tm confirming X11 ..
• 1 Xm respec tively, with the following characteristics:
1. X;+t is the proper subset of X; consisting of all the sentences of D; not verified by t;, for i = 1, . .. , m-1.
2. All sentences in Dm are verified by tm.
• We can construct a sequence tm+t. ... , t,.. that will confirm Xm+l = S. That is, the sequence tm+t, ... 1 tn will verify every sentence in S without falsifying any. We will associate with tm+t• ... , tn the "nested decreasing sequence" Xm+l• ... , Xn where X;+l is the proper subset of X; consisting of all the sentences of S; not verified by t; fori= m + 11 ••• , n. We can now assign probabilities to the truth-assignments t1, ••• , tn in the following way:
.. , n -1 and P(t,.)
:= e; n -1
(8) We must show that, in fact, every sentence d in D obtains P( d) � 1 -e: and that every sentence s in S obtains P(s) = 1. Since every sentenced is verified in at least one of the member of the sequence X1, •.
• , Xn, using Eq. (1) we have that fori< n:
e;i-1 (1-e) P(d ; ) � e;i-1 (1 -e)+ e'(l-e: ) + ... + e n -1 = 1 -e:
( 9) and P(dn) = 1 if it is only verified by the last truth assignment when Si s originally empty. Finally, since no sentence s in S is ever falsified by the sequence of truth assignments t11 ••• , tn and each and every s in S is verified at least once, it follows from Eq (1) and the process by which we assigned probabilities to t�, ... 1 tn that indeed P(s) = 1 for every s E S.
Proof of the only if part:
t.From the definition of p-entailment, if X � P d' then for all e > 0 there exists a 6 > 0 such that for all P E 'Px,6 which are proper for X and d', P("' d') ::; e:. This means that for all proper probability assignments P for X and d' 10, the sentence "'"' d' gets an arbitrarily low probability whenever all defeasible sentences in X can be assigned arbitrarily high probability and all strict sentences in X can be assigned probability equal to 1. Thus X U {'""' d'} is substantively inconsistent. Proof of the if part: (If X U {"' d'} is substantively inconsistent then X p-en tails d'.) Let X U {"' d'} be substantively inconsistent. From Theorem 1, we know that there must be a subset X' of X U {,..., d'} that is not confirmable. Furthermore, since X is p-consistent, X' = X" U {-d'}. Let 'Ps stand for the set of probability distributions that are proper for X and ,.._. d' such that if P E 'Ps, then P(s) = 1 for all s in X 11 • We will consider two cases depending on the structure of X": Case 1.-X" does not include any defeasible sentences. t.From Theorem 11 we know that ,.._. d' cannot be tolerated by X" for otherwise X' wouldn't be inconsistent. It follows from Eq. (1) (probability assignment) that P(-d') = 0 for all P E 'Ps. Thus, P ( d') = 1 in all P E 'Ps and since any probability distribution that is in 'Px,< must also belong to 'Ps, it follows from the defi nition of p-entailment that X �P d'. Case 2.-X" includes defeasible and a possible empty set of strict sentences. Since X"U{-d'} is substantively inconsistent, from the proof of Theorem 1, the following must be true for all probability distributions P E 'Ps:
10Note that from the definition of p-entailmentthere must exists at least one P proper for X and d'.
(10) (11) 11We know that Psis not empty due to the first condition of substantive inconsistency, a.s applied to XU{� d'}.
Also in the case where X does not contain any strict sentences, 'Ps simply denotes all probability distributions that are proper for X and "' d'.
Since Up(d) = 1-P(d) and Up(d') = 1-P(d'), Eq. (11) says that 1-P(d') can be made arbitrarily small by requiring the values 1 -P(d) for d E D to be sufficiently small and the values of P(s) to be 1 for all s E S. This is equivalent to say that X Fp d1• Theorem 3 If X = D U S is p-consistent, X strictly p-entails <P => 1/J if and only if there exists a subset S' of S such that S' U {True -+ <P} is p-consistent and ¢J => ..., ¢ is not tolerated by S'.
Proof It follows from the proof of Theorem 2 (see case 1 of the if part).
Theorem 6 Let :F be a set of propositional formulas, and let X = D U S be the a set of defeasible and strict sentences constructed from the formulas in :F. The worst case complexity of testing the consistency of X is bounded by [PS x ( � + ISI)J where IDI and lSI are the number of defeasible and strict sentences respectively, and 'PS is the complexity of propositional satisfiability for the material counterpart of the sentences in X.
Proof The following procedure for testing consistency finds a "nested decreasing sequence", (see proof of Theorem 1), if one exists; otherwise, it returns failure.
PROCEDURE TEST_COISISTENCY
INPUT: a set X= DU S ot defeasible and strict sentences
1.
LET D1 := D 2.
WHILE D' is not empty DO 3. WHILE S' is not empty DO
7.
Pick any sentence s E S' and test if s is tolerated by S 8.
IF s is tolerated then
LETS':= 51-s
ELSE HALT: the set is
IICOISISTEll'! EirDWHILE
10.
The set is COJSISTEHT
EID PROCEDURE
If the procedure stops at either line ( 4) or line (9) a non confirmable subset is found, and by theorem 1 the set of sentences is inconsistent. On the other hand, if the procedure reaches line (10), X cannot possibly contain a subset that is not confirmable. Any such subset (see Definition 4) would have halted the procedure either at line (4) or at line {9), thus, by Theorem 1, X must be consistent. It follows that the procedure is correct.
To assess the time complexity, note that the WHILE-loop of line (6) will be executed lSI times in the worst case, and each time we must do at most PS work to test the satisfiability of S-s; thus, its complexity is lSI x PS. In order to find a tolerated sentence d = <P --+ '1/1 in D', we must test at most \D'I times (once for each sentenced ED') fm the satisfiability of the conjunction of ¢;A¢ and the material counterparts of the sentences in SuD'-{ d}. However, the size of D' is decremented by at least one sentence in each iteration of the WHILE loop in line (2), therefore the number of times that we test for satisfi ability is IDI + IDI � 1 + \DI-2 + . . . + 1 which is bounded by �· Thus, the overall time complexity is O[PS x (�+lSI)].
